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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
         In the wake of the Three Mile Island nuclear accident 
in 1979, more than two thousand individuals brought suit for 
personal injuries.  The forty-two plaintiffs in this appeal 
missed Pennsylvania's two year limitations date, and filed suit 
in Mississippi in order to fall within that state's six year 
statute of limitations.  These plaintiffs now challenge the 
retroactive application of the choice of law provision of the 
Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-408, 102 
Stat. 1066.  Retroactive application of the choice of law 
provision would require application of Pennsylvania's statute of 
limitations to all actions arising from the Three Mile Island 
accident and would bar plaintiffs' claims filed in Mississippi.  
Plaintiffs argue retroactive application of the choice of law 
provision violates federal constitutional guarantees of due 
process.  Alternatively they argue that even if the Pennsylvania 
statute of limitations applies, Pennsylvania law provides for a 
grace period in which to file their claims.  Because retroactive 
application of the choice of law provision was a rational 
exercise of Congress' legislative power, we hold it does not 
violate due process.  Additionally, we hold Pennsylvania law does 
not provide for a grace period under the circumstances of this 
case. 
         The same plaintiffs also challenge summary judgment 
rendered against them in actions they filed in Pennsylvania state 
court after the two year limitation date.  They assert the 
statute of limitations should have been tolled under Pennsylvania 
law.  Because plaintiffs have failed to raise a material issue of 
fact, we will affirm summary judgment. 
                 I.  Facts and Procedural History 
         On March 28, 1979, the Three Mile Island nuclear power 
facility located near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania released radiation 
into the atmosphere.  As a result, thousands of area residents 
and businesses filed suit against the owners and operators of the 
facility, alleging various injuries.  In 1985, each of the 
forty-two plaintiffs involved in this appeal filed suit in 
Pennsylvania state court, Mississippi state court, and 
Mississippi federal court to recover for personal injuries 
allegedly suffered in the incident.  The Mississippi actions were 
filed within that state's six year statute of limitations for 
personal injury actions. 
         In September 1986, defendants moved for summary 
judgment in plaintiffs' Pennsylvania state court actions 
contending each claim related to health problems diagnosed more 
than two years before plaintiffs commenced their suits.  The 
Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania entered 
summary judgment for defendants, finding plaintiffs' claims 
barred by Pennsylvania's two year statute of limitations.  In re 
TMI Litig. Cases Consolidated II, No. 426 S (1985) (Dauphin Co. 
February 20, 1987); In re TMI Litig. Cases Consolidated II, No. 
426 S (1985) (Dauphin Co. July 6, 1987).  The Pennsylvania 
Superior Court affirmed.  In re TMI Litig. Cases Consolidated II, 
No. 00426 Harrisburg 1987 (Pa. Super. July 15, 1988).   
         Subsequently, Congress enacted the Price-Anderson 
Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-408, 102 Stat. 1066, 
which created a federal cause of action--the "public liability 
action"--for injuries resulting from nuclear incidents, 42 U.S.C. 
 2014(hh) (1988), and provided for jurisdiction over and the 
consolidation of such actions in the federal district court in 
the district where the accident occurred, 42 U.S.C.  
2210(n)(2).  Defendants removed the Pennsylvania and Mississippi 
state cases to federal court in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania pursuant to 42 U.S.C.  2210(n)(2).  At the time of 
removal of the Pennsylvania state cases, the time to appeal the 
grant of summary judgment to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had 
not yet expired.  The Mississippi federal actions were 
transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 
U.S.C.  1404(a). 
         After consolidation of the cases in the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment 
with respect to the Mississippi state and federal court actions 
on the grounds that plaintiffs' claims were untimely under the 
Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988.  Section 11(b) of the 
Amendments Act, the choice of law provision (codified at 42 
U.S.C.  2014(hh) (1988)), provides that "the substantive rules 
of decision in [any public liability action] shall be derived 
from the law of the State in which the nuclear incident involved 
occurs."      Section 20(b) of the Amendments Act, the effective date 
provision (codified as a note to 42 U.S.C.  2014), provides that 
"the amendments made by Section 11" of the Amendments Act "shall 
apply to nuclear incidents occurring before, on, or after the 
date of the enactment of this Act."  42 U.S.C.  2014 note 
(emphasis added).  The district court held that  20(b), read in 
conjunction with  11(b), compels retroactive application of 
Pennsylvania's two year statute of limitations to the causes of 
action brought by the plaintiffs, mandating the dismissal of the 
Mississippi state and federal cases as time barred.  In re TMI 
Litig. Cases Consol. II, No. 88-1452, slip. op. at 2-6 (M.D. Pa. 
Aug. 16, 1993).  Plaintiffs do not dispute this reading of the 
Amendments Act on appeal. 
         Plaintiffs asserted before the district court that 
retroactive application of the choice of law provision would 
violate constitutional guarantees of due process.  They also 
argued that Pennsylvania law, incorporated as federal law by the 
Amendments Act, would provide a grace period in which to file 
their claims.  The district court rejected both arguments, id. at 
15-20, and plaintiffs now appeal the district court's grant of 
summary judgment. 
         The district court also adopted the prior judgment 
rendered by the Court of Common Pleas against plaintiffs in the 
Pennsylvania state cases.  Id. at 23.  Plaintiffs sought 
reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment, arguing that 
under the intervening holding of the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
in Marinari v. Asbestos Corp., 612 A.2d 1021 (Pa. Super. 1992), 
their claims arising from "second injuries" should not have been 
dismissed.  Upon reconsideration, the district court ordered 
plaintiffs to specify which plaintiffs had "second injuries" 
subject to the Marinari rule.  In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, 
No. 88-1452, slip. op. at 13 (M.D. Pa. June 1, 1994).  On July 
12, 1994, the parties entered into a stipulation that Marinaridid not 
relate to the "initial injury" claims which were the 
subject of defendants' motion for summary judgment and that any 
"second injury" claims would be treated in a separate class 
action.  In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, No. 88-1452 (M.D. Pa. 
July 14, 1994).  The district court then entered summary judgment 
against plaintiffs on the "initial injury" claims and dismissed 
them as time barred.  In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, No. 88- 
1452 (M.D. Pa. July 22, 1994).  Plaintiffs appeal this order, 
arguing the statute of limitations had not expired on "initial 
injury" claims. 
         The district court had jurisdiction over these "public 
liability actions" under 42 U.S.C.  2210(n)(2), and we exercise 
jurisdiction over the district court's final orders under 28 
U.S.C.  1291.  Our review of the district court's grant of 
summary judgment is plenary.  See F.D.I.C. v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 
850, 860 (3d Cir. 1994). 
                   II.  Statutory Construction 
         The district court held the language of  20(b) is 
unambiguous and "by its very terms clearly requires the 
retroactive application of all of the provisions of  11, 
including the choice of law provision."  In re TMI Litig. Cases 
Consol. II, No. 88-1452, slip. op. at 3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 1993).  
Although plaintiffs have not challenged the district court's 
reading of the Amendments Act on appeal, we exercise plenary 
review of the district court's construction of the Act.  Moody v. 
Sec. Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir. 
1992). 
         Section 20(b) unambiguously calls for the retroactive 
application of the choice of law provision in  11(b).  The 
choice of law provision in turn provides that "the substantive 
rules for decision" shall be derived from Pennsylvania law.  
Since the statute of limitations is a substantive rule of 
decision, Menichini v. Grant, 995 F.2d 1224, 1228 n.2 (3d Cir. 
1993); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  5524 (1981), we believe the 
Pennsylvania statute of limitations applies retroactively to 
plaintiffs' causes of action filed in Mississippi.  Congress 
could have exempted statutes of limitations from retroactive 
application, but it did not.  Accordingly, plaintiffs' 
Mississippi causes of action are time-barred, unless some 
constraint imposed by the Constitution or state law prevents this 
result. 
                        III.  Due Process 
         The district court held the choice of law provision of 
the Price-Anderson Amendments Act requires application of 
Pennsylvania law, including the Pennsylvania statute of 
limitations, to the Mississippi state and federal cases.  
Plaintiffs argue the retroactive application of Pennsylvania's 
statute of limitations to bar properly filed and already pending 
causes of action violates federal constitutional due process.  
Well-established precedent indicates that it does not. 
                                A. 
         Under the United States Constitution, legislation 
affecting a pending tort claim is not subject to "heightened 
scrutiny" due process review because a pending tort claim does 
not constitute a vested right.  See Hammond v. United States, 786 
F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1986) (plaintiff does not have a vested 
right in a tort cause of action until there is a final, 
unreviewable judgement); see also Arbour v. Jenkins, 903 F.2d 
416, 420 (6th Cir. 1990) (retroactivity of a statute does not 
make it unconstitutional as a legal claim affords no enforceable 
property right until reduced to final judgement); Sowell v. 
American Cyanamid Co., 888 F.2d 802, 805 (11th Cir. 1989) (same).  
Other courts of appeals that have recently addressed the 
constitutionality of retroactive legislation that either 
abolishes or substantially affects a plaintiff's pending tort 
cause of action have reviewed such legislation on a "rational 
basis" standard.  See, e.g., In re Consolidated U.S. Atmospheric 
Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982, 990-91 (9th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff 
challenging retroactivity bears the burden of showing that the 
legislature acted in arbitrary, irrational way), cert. denied sub 
nom. Konizeski v. Livermore Labs, 485 U.S. 905 (1988); see alsoHammond, 
786 F.2d at 13.  In In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, 
940 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Gumby v. 
General Pub. Utils. Corp., 503 U.S. 906 (1992), we held that due 
process requires only that "the retroactive application of a 
statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose 
furthered by rational means."  Id. at 860 (quoting Pension 
Benefit Guarantee Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 
(1984)).  Accordingly, in order to show that retroactive 
application of the choice of law provision of the Amendments Act 
violates due process guarantees, plaintiffs bear the burden of 
showing that retroactive application was "irrational in purpose 
and effect."  Id. at 861.  This they cannot do. 
                                B. 
         Congress adopted the Amendments Act "to effect 
uniformity, equity, and efficiency in the disposition of public 
liability claims" arising from nuclear accidents.  H.R. Rep. No. 
104, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 18 (1987).  We believe 
retroactive application of the Amendments Act's choice of law 
provision furthers each of these goals. 
         First, retroactive application of the Amendments Act's 
choice of law provision uniformly applies Pennsylvania law to all 
plaintiffs.  Second, retroactive application advances equity by 
applying the same law to all similarly situated plaintiffs and  
eliminating inconsistent results.  While retroactive application 
of the choice of law provision requires dismissal of these 
plaintiffs' claims which were filed in compliance with 
Mississippi's six year statute of limitations, this result is not 
inequitable.  These actions were time-barred in Pennsylvania when 
they were brought, and plaintiffs resorted to a distant forum in 
order to avoid Pennsylvania's statute of limitations.  
Application of the law of the state in which the accident 
occurred, the plaintiffs live, and where the plaintiffs were 
allegedly injured is not inequitable.   
         Finally, retroactive application of the choice of law 
provision promotes efficiency by allowing the constitutional 
exercise of federal jurisdiction over, and the consolidation of, 
these "public liability actions."  Prior to the Amendments Act, 
the Price-Anderson Act provided for federal jurisdiction over 
only a limited class of cases--those arising from an 
"extraordinary nuclear occurrence."  Kiick v. Metropolitan Edison 
Co., 784 F.2d 490, 493 (3d Cir. 1986); Stibitz v. Gen. Pub. 
Utils. Corp., 746 F.2d 993, 997 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 1214 (1985).  Because the Nuclear Regulatory Commission did 
not designate the Three Mile Island accident an "extraordinary 
nuclear occurrence," the federal courts lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear Three Mile Island cases filed in 
jurisdictions across the country.  This situation resulted in 
"duplicative determinations of similar issues in multiple 
jurisdictions."  S. Rep. No. 218, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 
(1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1476, 1488. 
         Congress sought to remedy the procedural problems 
plaguing the Three Mile Island cases by retroactively providing 
for federal jurisdiction over them and allowing their 
consolidation.  But in creating federal jurisdiction, Congress 
was constrained by the constitutional principle that it cannot 
confer subject matter jurisdiction on federal courts where there 
is no underlying federal statute creating a federal question.  
See Osborne v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738 
(1824); Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 
(1983); see also In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, 940 F.2d at 
849 ("a case cannot be said to arise under a federal statute 
where there is nothing more than a jurisdictional grant.").  
Congress was clearly aware of this constitutional constraint.  
It did not, therefore, simply grant federal courts subject matter 
jurisdiction over all cases arising from nuclear accidents.  
Instead it created substantive federal law governing nuclear 
accidents in the choice of law provision of the Amendments Act by 
providing "the substantive rules of decision in [any public 
liability action] shall be derived from the law of the State in 
which the nuclear incident involved occurs." 42 U.S.C.  
2014(hh).  In the absence of the retroactive application of the 
choice of law provision to the Three Mile Island cases, Congress' 
retroactive creation of federal jurisdiction over them in the 
Amendments Act would be nothing more than an unconstitutional 
grant of jurisdiction without any underlying substantive federal 
legislation creating a federal question.  In re TMI Litig. Cases 
Consol. II, 940 F.2d at 854-55; O'Connor v. Commonwealth Edison 
Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1096-1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 
2711 (1994).  Accordingly, there is little doubt that the 
retroactive application of the choice of law provision has 
furthered the efficient and uniform processing of claims arising 
from the Three Mile Island accident by allowing those claims to 
be brought and to be consolidated in federal court. 
         Because retroactive application of the choice of law 
provision to pending causes of action advances Congress' goals of 
uniformity, equity and efficiency in the disposition of claims 
arising from nuclear accidents, it is not arbitrary and 
irrational.  Plaintiffs have not demonstrated retroactive 
application violates constitutional due process.  Cf. O'Conner v. 
Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d at 1102 (retroactive application 
of Amendments Act not arbitrary and irrational); In re TMI Litig. 
Cases Consol. II, 940 F.2d at 860-61 (same). 
             IV.  Grace Period under Pennsylvania Law 
         Plaintiffs also argue retroactive application of the 
Amendments Act's choice of law provision does not require 
dismissal of the Mississippi actions.  They assert the choice of 
law provision incorporates all Pennsylvania law as federal law, 
including a century-old line of Pennsylvania cases that holds due 
process requires a grace period when the legislature 
retroactively curtails a statute of limitations.  See Kay v. 
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 65 Pa. 269 (1870); Byers v. 
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 18 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 187 (Allegheny Co. 
1896); Philadelphia B. & W.R. Co. v. Quaker City Flour Mills Co., 
127 A. 845 (Pa. 1925); Ferki v. Frantz's Transfer Co., 31 A.2d 
586 (Pa. Super. 1943); Wilson v. Central Penn Indus., Inc., 452 
A.2d 257 (Pa. Super. 1982).  The district court declined to 
follow this line of cases, doubting its vitality in light of 
intervening developments in property law relating to vested 
rights, and refusing to read broad due process rights into the 
Pennsylvania Constitution on such a weak precedential basis.  In 
re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, No. 88-1452, slip. op. at 17-19 
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 1993).  Even if the grace period doctrine 
retains force under the Pennsylvania Constitution, we do not 
believe the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply it under the 
facts of this case. 
         None of the Pennsylvania grace period cases addresses a 
situation in which Pennsylvania plaintiffs failed to sue within 
the time period allotted by the Pennsylvania statute of 
limitations and brought suit in another state's courts to avoid 
Pennsylvania's time bar.  We believe the Pennsylvania borrowing 
statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  5521 (1981), accurately 
reflects current state policy against "forum shopping" by 
applying to claims arising in another state either the other 
state's statute of limitations or the Pennsylvania statute of 
limitations, whichever is shorter.  "Pennsylvania's borrowing 
statute unequivocally [evinces] the legislative intent to prevent 
a plaintiff who sues in Pennsylvania from obtaining greater 
rights than those available in the state where the cause of 
action arose."  Gwaltney v. Stone, 564 A.2d 498, 503 (Pa. Super. 
1989).  We believe Pennsylvania courts would not look favorably 
on plaintiffs here who missed Pennsylvania's statute of 
limitations, although Pennsylvania is the state where the 
accident occurred, and brought suit in Mississippi.  Even if the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would require a grace period when the 
Pennsylvania legislature retroactively shortens a statute of 
limitations, we do not believe they would require a grace period 
in this case. 
        V.  The Discovery Rule and Fraudulent Concealment  
         Plaintiffs in the Pennsylvania state cases appeal the 
district court's grant of summary judgment on their "initial 
injury" claims.  First, plaintiffs argue the statute of 
limitations was tolled under the "discovery rule" until they knew 
or should have known their injuries were caused by the Three Mile 
Island accident.  Plaintiffs assert there are material issues of 
fact as to whether they knew or should have known the cause of 
their injuries.  Second, plaintiffs argue the statute of 
limitations was tolled because defendants fraudulently concealed 
information about the Three Mile Island accident. 
                      A.  The Discovery Rule 
         The discovery rule tolls the running of a statute of 
limitations until "the plaintiff knows, or reasonably should 
know:  (1) that he has been injured, and (2) that his injury has 
been caused by another party's conduct."  Cathcart v. Keene 
Industrial Insulation, 471 A.2d 493, 500 (Pa. Super. 1984) (in 
banc); see also Hayward v. Medical Ctr. of Beaver County, 608 
A.2d 1040, 1043 (Pa. 1992).  Every plaintiff has a duty to 
exercise "reasonable diligence" in ascertaining the existence of 
an injury and its cause.  Stauffer v. Ebersole, 560 A.2d 816, 817 
(Pa. Super.), app. denied, 571 A.2d 384 (1989). 
         In their brief, plaintiffs assert that several 
plaintiffs filed their actions within two years of diagnosis of a 
specific injury, and thereby complied with the discovery rule.  
Under Pennsylvania law, plaintiffs bear the burden of proving 
they filed their claims within the applicable statute of 
limitations.  See Osei-Afriyie v. Medical College of 
Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876, 884 (3d Cir.) (citing cases), cert. 
denied,  112 S. Ct. 581 (1991).  Where, as here, the non-moving 
party bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is 
appropriate if non-movants fail to "make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to [their] case."  
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590 (1993).  In responding to 
a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must "go 
beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for 
trial."  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) 
(internal quotations omitted).  Beyond mere assertions, 
plaintiffs have not directed us to any evidence in the record 
that raises a material issue of fact as to whether any plaintiff 
filed suit within two years of discovery of an "initial injury."  
Accordingly, we believe summary judgment was appropriate. 
         Plaintiffs also argue that "because the [discovery 
rule] involves questions of what a reasonable person should have 
known, a classic jury question is invariably presented, thereby 
precluding the use of the summary judgment procedure."  Brief of 
the Appellants at 35-36.  But the Court of Common Pleas held, and 
the record confirms, that the plaintiffs knew of the Three Mile 
Island accident, and knew or should have known that exposure to 
radiation could cause adverse health affects.  In such 
circumstances, the discovery rule does not toll the running of 
the statute of limitations. 
         Plaintiffs also assert summary judgment was improper 
because factual questions remain as to whether they used 
reasonable diligence to discover the cause of their injuries.  
The Court of Common Pleas held: 
              The responses to interrogatories . . . 
         reveal plaintiffs knew of their specific 
         injury more than two years prior to the time 
         they filed their complaint.  Thus, at that 
         time they possessed the requisite knowledge 
         to set the statutory clock running.  Under 
         the law of Pennsylvania they were under a 
         duty to use all reasonable diligence to 
         investigate the operative facts of their 
         cause of action. . . . Given the notoriety of 
         the accident and the plethora of 
         investigative reports available to 
         plaintiffs, it is clear that they had the 
         "means of discovery" available to them.  
 
In re TMI Litig. Cases Consolidated II, No. 426 S (1985), slip 
op. at 8-9 (Dauphin Co. February 20, 1987).  Plaintiffs have not 
directed us to any evidence in the record that leads us to doubt 
these conclusions.  Accordingly, we believe the district court 
properly granted summary judgment with respect to "initial 
injury" claims. 
                    B.  Fraudulent Concealment 
         Plaintiffs also argue the statute of limitations was 
tolled because defendants fraudulently concealed information 
relating to the Three Mile Island accident.  See Molineux v. 
Reed, 532 A.2d 792, 794 (Pa. 1987) ("Where through fraud or 
concealment, the defendant causes the plaintiff to relax his 
vigilance or deviate from his right of inquiry, the defendant is 
estopped from invoking the bar of the statute of limitations.")   
(internal quotations omitted).  In order to establish fraudulent 
concealment by a defendant, a plaintiff must prove "an 
affirmative or independent act of concealment that would divert 
or mislead the plaintiff from discovering the injury" or its 
cause.  Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 925 (3d Cir. 1991).  But 
plaintiffs have not directed us to any evidence that defendants 
sought to conceal the cause of their injuries.  While plaintiffs 
have referred to statements by defendants' employees downplaying 
the seriousness of the accident immediately after it occurred, 
such statements do not create an issue of material fact with 
respect to fraudulent concealment. 
         In response to plaintiffs' fraudulent concealment 
argument, the Court of Common pleas found: 
              The contention simply cannot prevail.  
         Here, defendants did not "conceal" the fact 
         that radiation escaped from the TMI facility.  
         Defendants did nothing to induce plaintiffs 
         not to file timely claims.  In fact, the 
         notice of the 1981 class action settlement, 
         which was disseminated to all households 
         within twenty-five miles of the reactor and 
         widely publicized, put all persons on notice 
         that if they believed they had a claim for 
         personal injury, they should start their own 
         lawsuit.  This is not the type of conduct 
         which could give rise to a claim of estoppel. 
 
              Moreover, given the vast amount of 
         information available to plaintiffs 
         concerning the nature and extent of the 
         accident, it is not rationally possible to 
         ascertain any basis from which plaintiffs 
         could claim that defendants are estopped from 
         asserting the limitations defense.  
         Defendants engaged in no affirmative action 
         which could have caused these plaintiffs to 
         deviate from their right of inquiry. 
 
In re TMI Litig. Cases Consolidated II, No. 426 S (1985), slip 
op. at 10 (Dauphin Co. February 20, 1987).   
         We agree that defendants' statements could not have 
caused plaintiffs to deviate from their right of inquiry into the 
source of their injuries.  The record reflects that voluminous 
information about the Three Mile Island accident was in the 
public domain.  Moreover, many other plaintiffs obtained 
sufficient information to file suit within the statute of 
limitations.  Under these circumstances, plaintiffs' have not 
raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to 
fraudulent concealment.  Summary judgment was proper. 
                         VI.  Conclusion  
         The choice of law provision of the Price Anderson 
Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C.  2014(hh), mandates the retroactive 
application of Pennsylvania's two year statute of limitations to 
the plaintiffs claims filed in Mississippi state and federal 
court.  Retroactive application comports with constitutional 
requirements of due process, and, in the circumstances of this 
case, Pennsylvania law does not provide for a grace period in 
which plaintiffs may file their claims.  No issue of material 
fact precluded a grant of summary judgment based on the statute 
of limitations in the Pennsylvania state cases.  For the 
foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the district 
court. 
 
                         
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
              I dissent primarily because I cannot conclude that 
Congress intended the Amendments Act to extinguish pending suits 
that were timely instituted in accordance with then-applicable 
statutes of limitations simply because they would not have 
satisfied the statute of limitations of the forum in which the 
underlying nuclear accident occurred.  Nor can I conclude that 
Congress intended that certain pending claims survive while other 
identical ones cease to exist as a result of limitations periods 
that did not apply on the day those claims were filed.  Certainly 
such a result is inconsistent with Congress's intent to promote 
"'equitable and uniform treatment of victims.'"  TMI II, 940 F.2d 
at 861 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 104, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 
at 18, 29 (1987)).  
              I agree with the majority that the jurisdictional 
provision, the choice-of-law provision, and the definition of 
"public liability action" contained in section 11 apply 
retroactively to lawsuits that were pending when the Amendments 
Act was passed.  Because the majority's understanding of that 
retroactive application sweeps too broadly, however, I 
respectfully dissent.    
              It is well established that "[a] law is 
retrospective if it 'changes the legal consequences of acts 
completed before its effective date.'"  Miller v. Florida, 482 
U.S. 423, 430 (1987)(quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 31 
(1981)).  Thus, retroactive legislation includes "'all statutes, 
which, though operating only from their passage, affect vested 
rights and past transactions.'"  Id. (quoting Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F.Cas. 756, 767 (No. 
13,156)(CCDNH 1814))(emphasis added).  In the words of Justice 
Story, 
         "every statute, which takes away or impairs 
         vested rights acquired under existing laws, 
         or creates a new obligation, imposes a new 
         duty, or attaches a new disability, in 
         respect to transactions or considerations 
         already past, must be deemed retrospective . 
         . . ." 
 
Id. (citation omitted).  Nevertheless, "deciding when a statute 
operates 'retroactively' is not always a simple or mechanical 
task."  Landgraf v. USI Film Products, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 
1483, 1498 (1994).  Ultimately, whether a particular application 
is retroactive "depends upon what one considers to be the 
determinative event by which retroactivity or prospectivity is to 
be calculated."  Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 
494 U.S. 827, 857 n.3 (1990)(Scalia, J., concurring).   
              In this case, Congress expressly stated that the 
Amendments Act "shall apply to nuclear incidents occurring 
before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act."  42 
U.S.C.  2014 (emphasis added).  I agree with the majority that 
the term "nuclear incidents" includes pending actions arising 
from such incidents.  What is unclear from the statute is how 
exactly the "shall apply" language should be interpreted in the 
context of pending actions.     
              The statute itself offers no guidance on this 
point.  As a theoretical matter, however, retroactivity can be 
understood in one of two ways.  First, it can be understood as 
the majority apparently construes it: as a rewriting of history.  
Under this theory, section 20 reaches into the past to transform 
pending lawsuits as of their inception, undoing and rewriting all 
subsequent proceedings and applying new law as though it had 
existed from the date of filing.  This theory engenders a 
historical fiction pursuant to which plaintiffs' suits were 
public liability actions when they were filed in 1985, governed 
by Pennsylvania substantive law and subject to original federal 
jurisdiction, although the Amendments Act did not take effect 
until three years later.   
              Alternatively, the Amendments Act can be seen as 
retroactive in the more limited sense that it "attaches new legal 
consequences to events completed before its enactment."  
Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1499.  This theory would mean simply that 
all pending actions asserting public liability were transformed 
on August 20, 1988 into public liability actions, and that the 
federal courts acquired original jurisdiction over those actions 
as of, but not prior to, that date.    
              Either interpretation of retroactivity is 
acceptable as a theoretical matter.  It is our task to determine 
which is the correct one under the circumstances of this case.   
              I conclude that the latter interpretation of 
retroactivity under section 20 is the correct one, for several 
reasons.  First and foremost, applying the Amendments Act to 
pending cases from August 20, 1988 forward accomplishes the goals 
that Congress intended the retroactivity provision to accomplish 
by defining the pending Three Mile Island cases as public 
liability actions and providing for their removal to federal 
court and litigation under federal substantive law. 
              Second, where, as here, the statute is ambiguous 
as to the appropriate scope of retroactivity, I believe that the 
well-established presumption against statutory retroactivity 
requires interpreting that scope narrowly.  In this case, the 
statute neither states explicitly that the substantive law of the 
state in which the incident occurred applies "retroactively" to 
pending actions nor offers any guidance as to how the language 
"shall apply" should be interpreted in the context of a pending 
action.  It is ambiguous as to whether section 11 applies to 
pending actions as of August 20, 1988, or whether, as the 
majority concludes, it applies to such actions as of their 
inception.  In the absence of explicit Congressional instruction, 
I believe that the principles underlying the anti-retroactivity 
presumption make the former interpretation far more appropriate 
than the sweeping approach to retroactivity enunciated by the 
majority.     
              Third, this interpretation eliminates the strained 
historical fiction on which the majority opinion, by necessity, 
must be based, thereby providing a more rational analytic 
framework for effectuating Congress's intent and leading to a 
more equitable result.  For the most part, the practical effect 
of the retroactivity provision is the same under either 
interpretation; in either case, rulings made prior to the passage 
of the Amendments Act on the basis of substantive law which no 
longer applies can be modified to conform to the new governing 
law of the case.  Causes of action recognized in the filing state 
but not in the forum state can be dismissed.  Rules of evidence, 
burdens of proof, and jury instructions all can be adjusted to 
accommodate the law of the forum.  Under the majority's 
interpretation, these adjustments would be made by adopting a 
fiction that Pennsylvania law applied from the beginning and then 
relitigating the entire case accordingly.  Under my 
interpretation, these adjustments can be made simply by applying 
Pennsylvania law after August 20, 1988 to motions, new or 
renewed, brought by the parties.  In other words, after August 
20, 1988, a party can move to dismiss a claim that no longer has 
any legal basis, renew a summary judgment motion that failed 
previously but might now succeed, or seek reconsideration of 
prior evidentiary rulings that do not stand up under the new 
governing law.  Thus, while the two interpretations require 
different procedures for implementation, the ultimate effect on 
the parties is, for the most part, the same in both cases. 
              In the statute of limitations context, however, 
the difference in theory between the two interpretations 
translates into a crucial difference in outcome.  The historical 
fiction on which the majority's theory is premised forces the 
majority to conclude that plaintiffs' action, although filed 
within the Mississippi statute of limitations, is now barred by 
the Pennsylvania statute of limitations--an inequity which I 
believe contravenes Congress's intent and which my theory avoids.  
Statutes of limitations are uniquely concerned with a specific 
point in time: the date on which the complaint was filed.  While 
a defendant can raise the statute of limitations as a defense at 
any time during the course of a lawsuit, the relevant question 
for the court is always whether, at the time the case was filed, 
the applicable statute of limitations was satisfied.  Because the 
majority reasons that section 20 requires extending Pennsylvania 
law back in time to the inception of plaintiffs' action, it 
concludes that Pennsylvania's statute of limitations applied--and 
was violated--at the time the suit was filed.  However, at the 
time it was filed, plaintiffs' lawsuit was not a public liability 
action.  As a result, I conclude that it was governed at the time 
it was filed by Mississippi, not Pennsylvania, law.  Although the 
substantive law of Pennsylvania governs plaintiffs' case from 
August 20, 1988 forward, the statute of limitations was satisfied 
or violated back in 1985, when Mississippi law applied.  At that 
time, under the applicable law, I conclude that it was satisfied. 
              Finally, the interpretation I endorse conforms 
with the "settled policy" of federal courts to "avoid an 
interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional 
issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation poses no 
constitutional question," Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 
864 (1989), by eliminating the constitutional questions of due 
process raised by the majority's interpretation.  If the 
Amendments Act applies to pending actions from August 20, 1988 
forward, then there is no issue as to whether the Act violates 
the due process rights of plaintiffs to pending lawsuits, because 
the Pennsylvania statute of limitations does not apply to deprive 
plaintiffs of their cause of action.   
              As a result, I conclude that the retroactivity 
provision of the Amendments Act does not rewrite history as 
applied to pending actions, but rather operates by changing the 
ground rules midway through the game, altering the legal status 
and governing law of pending actions from the time of its 
enactment forward.   
              The majority proffers that it agrees with this 
interpretation, and denies that its interpretation of section 20 
engenders a rewriting of history.  Nevertheless, while 
conceding that the definition of public liability action, the 
choice-of-law provision, and the original jurisdiction provision 
apply to pending cases from August 20, 1988 forward, the majority 
concludes that plaintiffs' lawsuit was filed in violation of 
Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations.  Both positions 
cannot be correct.  In effect, the Amendments Act drew a bright 
line down the middle of this lawsuit on August 20, 1988, dividing 
the case into two distinct parts.  Prior to August 20, 1988, the 
suit was generic and Mississippi law governed; since that date, 
it has been a public liability action and Pennsylvania law 
governs.  I think it logically inconsistent to hold, as the 
majority does, that plaintiffs' suit was not a public liability 
action when it was filed, and yet conclude that it was required 
at the time it was filed to satisfy the Pennsylvania statute of 
limitations--a statute that only applies to this action in its 
public liability incarnation.  Either plaintiffs' lawsuit was a 
public liability action when it was filed, subject to federal 
jurisdiction and Pennsylvania's statute of limitations, or it was 
not.     
              Therefore, in my view it is the majority, and not 
I, who seeks to treat the statute of limitations differently from 
all other "substantive rules for decision" of Pennsylvania law.  
While concluding that Pennsylvania substantive law operates on 
plaintiffs' lawsuit from August 20, 1988 forward, the majority 
carves out an exception for the statute of limitations, allowing 
it to reach back in time--crossing the imaginary line drawn by 
the Amendments Act--to operate on the suit on the day it was 
filed.  This treatment of the statute of limitations clashes 
directly with the majority's overarching theory of the case.  
Statutes of limitations, as discussed above, can only be violated 
(or satisfied) at one specific point in time--the day on which 
the suit was filed--notwithstanding that such violations can be 
called to the attention of the court at any point during the 
pendency of a lawsuit.  Under the majority's own interpretation 
of section 20, this case was not a public liability action when 
it was filed, and Pennsylvania law did not apply.  As a result, 
the majority's treatment of the statute of limitations cannot be 
reconciled with its interpretation of the meaning and effect of 
the Amendments Act.  
              The majority seeks to justify this illogical 
result in terms of congressional intent.  It is not at all clear, 
however, that Congress intended the choice-of-law provision of 
the Amendments Act to encompass statutes of limitations.  While 
it is well established that statutes of limitations are 
characterized as substantive law for purposes of the doctrine of 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), see Guaranty 
Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945), this does 
not mean that they are considered substantive in other contexts.  
Indeed, in holding that statutes of limitations are substantive 
for purposes of the Erie doctrine, such that federal courts 
sitting in diversity must apply state statutes of limitations, 
the Supreme Court confined its analysis narrowly to the context 
of Erie: 
              It is therefore immaterial whether 
              statutes of limitation are 
              characterized either as 
              'substantive' or 'procedural' in 
              State court opinions in any use of 
              those terms unrelated to the 
              specific issue before us.  Erie R. 
              Co. v. Tompkins was not an endeavor 
              to formulate scientific legal 
              terminology.  It expressed a policy 
              that touches vitally the proper 
              distribution of judicial power 
              between State and federal courts.  
              In essence, the intent of that 
              decision was to ensure that, in all 
              cases where a federal court is 
              exercising jurisdiction solely 
              because of the diversity of 
              citizenship of the parties, the 
              outcome of the litigation in 
              federal court should be 
              substantially the same, so far as 
              legal rules determine the outcome 
              of a litigation, as it would be if 
              tried in a State court. 
 
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 326 U.S. at 109 (emphasis added). 
 
              In this case, the majority opinion's conclusion 
that "the statute of limitations is a substantive rule of 
decision," Majority Opinion, typescript at 9, is based entirely 
on cases holding that statutes of limitations are substantive 
rather than procedural for purposes of Erie.  The 
characterization of statutes of limitations as substantive for 
Erie purposes, however, was not based on an assessment of their 
procedural or substantive nature in the abstract but rather on 
their impact on the federalism concerns that Erie's rough 
procedural/substantive distinction was intended to address.  SeeGuaranty 
Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 109.   
              In this case, by contrast, there is no federalism 
concern at issue and no balance of power between federal and 
state courts to be maintained.  The cause of action is federal, 
and the only question is whether Congress intended the term 
"substantive rules for decision" to include statutes of 
limitation.  The legislative history of the Amendments Act is 
silent on this point; indeed, there is nothing to indicate that 
Congress even considered the status of statutes of limitations 
under that Act, much less intended to include them as substantive 
rules of decision.  Moreover, a review of Pennsylvania case law 
makes clear that the courts of Pennsylvania "generally treat 
statutes of limitations as 'procedural.'"  AAMCO Transmissions, 
Inc. v. Harris, 759 F. Supp. 1141, 1143-44 (E.D. Pa. 
1991)(footnotes omitted); Boyle v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Ins. Co., 456 A.2d 156, 162 (1983); Altoona Area Sch. Dist. v. 
Campbell, 618 A.2d 1129, 1134 (1992).  This strikes me as a 
strong indication that the courts of Pennsylvania would not 
consider the phrase "substantive rules for decision" to include 
Pennsylvania's statutes of limitations.  For these reasons, I 
do not think that congressional intent with respect to statutes 
of limitations is clear enough to sustain the majority's 
logically inconsistent conclusion that plaintiffs' suit is time- 
barred.  See Majority Op., typescript at 10 ("Congress could 
have exempted statutes of limitations from retroactive 
application, but it did not."). 
              Nor is there any evidence in the legislative 
history or elsewhere that Congress intended the sweeping 
retroactivity that the majority endorses.  On the contrary, the 
legislative history indicates that the Amendments Act was based 
on the lessons of claims resulting from the TMI accident: 
              The experience with claims 
              following the TMI accident 
              demonstrates the advantages of the 
              ability to consolidate claims after 
              the nuclear incident.  Attorneys 
              representing both plaintiffs and 
              defendants in the TMI litigation 
              testified . . . that the ability to 
              consolidate claims in federal court 
              would greatly benefit the process 
              for determining compensation for 
              claimants . . . .  The availability 
              of the provisions for consolidation 
              of claims in the event of any 
              nuclear incident . . . would avoid 
              the inefficiencies resulting from 
              duplicative determinations of 
              similar issues in multiple 
              jurisdictions that may occur in the 
              absence of consolidation. 
 
S. Rep. No. 218, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1988 U.S. 
Cong. & Admin. News 1476, 1488; In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. 
II, 940 F.2d 832, 853 n.18 (3d Cir. 1991)(stating that Congress' 
decision to enact the Amendments Act was based on the lessons of 
litigation resulting from the TMI accident).  This indicates to 
me that Congress contemplated providing a mechanism for 
consolidating TMI cases to facilitate their continued litigation.  
This forward-looking approach evidenced by the legislative 
history is wholly inconsistent with a congressional desire to 
extinguish those suits on technical grounds. 
              Because I conclude that retroactive application of 
the choice-of-law provision means simply that Pennsylvania 
substantive law applies to and governs the instant litigation 
from August 20, 1988 forward, I respectfully dissent from the 
majority's far-reaching and overly broad interpretation of 
section 20 and from its conclusion that Pennsylvania's two-year 
statute of limitations reaches back in time to bar plaintiffs' 
suit.  Accordingly, I would reverse. 
